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Abstract 
The creation and application of new technologies in the form of new products or new 
processes is increasingly becoming a collective effort in which firms, universities and 
research laboratories as well as public and other institutions at various spatial scales are 
engaged. Some of these "networks" are international or even global, such as strategic 
alliances and R&D joint ventures, which are undertaken to mobilize complementary 
assets and to provide distant market access. However, it is at the the local and regional 
level that the development of technology-based firms is most often stimulated. The 
example of the Greater Boston region shows that these local links are particularly 
relevant for newly emerging industries such as the computer industry in the 1960's or the 
biotechnology industry in the 1980's. Relevant linkages include those to universities and 
research institutions as well as those to venture capitalists, business services, specialised 
suppliers and customers. Since very specific knowledge bases, firms and institutions are 
involved, only few regions of a country can develop such high technology networks. As 
the industries mature, not just the markets but also the supplier and collaborative 
linkages become international and global, and the embeddedness of these networks into 
the region therefore becomes less important. 
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1) Introduction 
Present economic development seemingly is characterised by a paradox. On the one hand 
global forces are becoming more important in the sense that more and more firms are acting 
in response to a world market and are exposed to global competition. The larger firms, in 
addition, maintain subsidiaries in many countries as well as collaborative links around the 
globe. On the other hand, there is evidence that within this global economy not just national 
but also regional and local environments still have a considerable - some argue an even incre-
asing - importance for the competitiveness of firms (Scott 1987, Sabel 1989, Porter 1990). 
Particularly in high-tech industries, competitiveness strongly depends on the ability to inno-
vate, i.e. to introduce new products or new processes (Scherer 1992). The long-run viability of 
regional and national economies depends furthermore on the continuous formation of new 
firms based on new ideas and technologies. The nature of the innovation process and its orga-
nisation, however, are different from the past. Neither the individual innovative entrepreneur 
nor the single large firm and its R&D department are corresponding to existing models. 
Technological innovations are increasingly becoming a collective effort in which other firms, 
universities and research laboratories as well as public institutions become involved at various 
spatial scales ( 11 networks 11 : Hakansson 1987, Camagni 1991, DeBresson et al. 1991, Maillat et 
al. 1993). 
The existing literature on firm networks is rather segmented. The management and industrial 
economics literature focuses on international or global alliances-; showing·that since the 1980s 
an increasing number of firms in high-technology industries have been engaging in strategic 
alliances (Hagedoorn and Schankenraad 1990, Pisano 1991, Dibner and Bulluck 1992, 
Gomes-Casseres 1992). These ventures are undertaken to mobilize complementary assets and 
to get access to technology and markets, thereby speeding up the introduction of new pro-
ducts. Much of this literature tends to ignore similar but often less formalised linkages at 
lower spatial scales which may also be highly relevant in the innovation process. The literature 
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on industrial districts, high-tech regions and "innovative milieux" in contrast focuses on those 
local/regional institutions and networks (Miller and Cote 1986, Aydalot and Keeble 1988, 
Bergman 1991, Pyke and Sengenberger 1992), however, often without recognizing the specific 
conditions in the respective industries as well as the historic transformation of such networks. 
In the following, I want to discuss at first conceptually why networks - and particularly those at 
the regional level - are relevant for high-technology firms. Then, the role of such institutions 
and networks for the development of two high-technology industries in the Greater Boston 
area will be studied. The computer industry was chosen as a mature technology-based industry 
and biotechnology as a newly emerging one. 
2) Conceptual Background 
2.1 The high-technology firm and its economic environment 
The competitiveness of high-technology firms strongly depends on the technological charac-
teristics of their products and processes. Their goods " ... embody relatively intensive research 
and development inputs, either directly at the final manufacturing stage or through the 
intermediate goods used in their production" (Scherer, 1992, p.3). They have to innovate con-
tinuously in order to stay competitive, thereby relying on internal and external resources, fac-
tors and institutions (see figure 1). Internally, a commitment to relevant functions such as 
research, development, design and marketing and their appropriate organisation are required. 
These functions perform "boundary spanning" tasks, such as technology screening and market 
monitoring, thus linking the firm to its environment (Aldrich 1979). 
From the external environment, firms draw special factor inputs, such as highly educated and 
skilled labor, knowledge inputs and (risk-)capital. In addition, high quality materials and 
components from suppliers as well as service support (management and technology consul-
ting) are needed. Public policy provides specialised infrastructure for education, transport and 
communication, thus securing some of those inputs. Furthermore, governments frequently 
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stimulate innovation through regulations and other direct and indirect forms of assistance. 
The local and regional environment of a firm is particularly relevant for the labor inputs, for 
venture capital (Florida et al. 1991), and for those knowledge inputs which are "embodied" in 
employees of regional firms, universities and research institutions (Miller and Cote 1987, 
Aydalot and Keeble 1988). In the case of firms this is often practical knowledge and skills 
(Malecki 1991). Also, services such as engineering, consulting or legal services are frequently 
drawn from the region since regular face-to-face contacts are involved. In certain regions also 
supplier and client linkages may be strong (Scott 1988); more often, however, these are 
national or international. Then, public policies, in particular, have a territorial dimension. 
Since the 1980s, local and regional governments have become more active in technology 
policy, both in Europe and the U.S. (Ewers and Allesch 1990, Schmandt and Wilson 1990). 
There has been a proliferation of programs which are intended either to attract high-tech 
firms from outside the region, to stimulate the endogenous formation of such firms (through 
e.g. incubators and science parks), or to facilitate the transfer of knowledge to regional firms 
(technology extension programs). 
As many studies on high-tech regions have shown, the mere existence of such factors in a 
region does not guarantee dynamic development (Miller and Cote 1987, Stohr 1987, Aydalot 
and Keeble 1988, Maillat 1991, 1993, Preer 1992). Of particular importance is the intensity of 
linkages between firms as well as institutions, triggering common learning processes and the 
accumulation of knowledge in an area. In many cases these relationships go beyond traditio-
nal "arms length" market transactions but show features of more stable "network" relations. 
2.2 Innovation networks: between markets and hierarchies 
Neo-institutionalists such as Williamson (1985) have pointed out that different kinds of insti-
tutions can be "used" by firms in order to coordinate the various transactions required to 
develop, produce and sell a product. Firms can use the market ("buy" through discrete arms-
length transactions) or provide necessary inputs themselves ("make": hierarchical coordina-
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tion). As a third option, they can engage in networks with other firms or institutions. These 
are more durable collaborative relations, such as strategic alliances, cooperations, joint ventu-
res or licensing agreements. They may also include durable vertical relations with suppliers 
and customers as well as informal relations to firms and institutions (Hakansson 1987, von 
Hippel 1987, DeBresson et al. 1991, Freeman 1991). 1) 
Internal organisation ("hierarchy") is considered the "best" mode of coordination under stable 
external conditions when there are significant internal economies of scale or scope involved, 
when there are internal cumulative effects through learning, or when there is a high risk of 
leakage of know-how and benefits to other firms. Mowery and Rosenberg (1989) consequently 
argue that the firm is in principle the "natural" place for R&D projects since it allows the firm 
to keep leakages low and to appropriate the benefits of R&D investment to a higher degree. 
Internal organisation, however, has disadvantages under dynamic technological or market 
conditions since the asset-specific investments such as R&D units , specialised equipment or 
human skills cannot easily be switched to other uses. 
The market is an efficient mode in the case of standardised inputs since it allows rapid adju-
stment to changing external conditions. The use of markets, however, becomes problematic in 
the case of highly specific assets such as R&D activities or high quality components. It is diffi-
cult to secure a high quality of these assets via volatile market relations and, in addition, there 
is a considerable danger of leakage of know-how and benefits to the other firms. 
Networks are more durable relations to selected partners. Therefore they allow a better 
knowledge of the capabilities and the reliability of partners, as well as of the quality of 
exchanged assets. Participation in networks also may provide a common understanding of 
technological problems as well as mutual learning among the actors involved (De Bresson 
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1) The boundaries of the network mode both towards the market and towards the firm, however, are blurred and 
not easy to define. Towards the firm it is blurred since technology or production linkages may be accompanied 
by equity stakes. Also market relations may tum into de facto network relations once they have endured over 
longer time. Many input linkages become long lasting relations in order to secure the quality as well as the 
reliability of deliveries. Lundvall (1988) therefore argues that "pure" market relations (in the sense of discrete 
"armslength" transactions) are much less frequent than neoclassical economists tend to assume. 
1991, Storper 1992). Compared to market relations they allow a better control of partners and 
thereby keep leakages smaller. Networks are more stable than pure market relations but they 
also are more flexible than the internal organisation. The following conditions are favouring 
currently the formation of networks in high-technology industries: 
* Major technology shifts render existing knowledge bases of firms obsolete. This occurs 
particularly with new pervasive technologies (such as microelectronics, new infor-
mation technologies or biotechnology) that affect many industries. Older firms are 
often not able to cope with these changes on the basis of their existing know-how. 
Network links allow the more rapid acquisition of required complementary know-how 
than internal R&D. 
* The increasing speed of technological change and the shortening of product life cycles 
makes R&D more costly but reduces the time left for its amortisation. Network links 
allow firms to speed up the processs and to keep R&D cost reasonably low. 
* Rapidly changing demand and markets make quality changes more frequent and the-
reby increase the need for flexibility. 
* A higher competitive pressure observed in the 1980s in many industries forced firms to 
cut costs and to focus on their core business. The development and production of 
components has therefore been frequently externalised (e.g. in the computer industry 
or the car industry). The links to these new suppliers often take the form of network 
relations. 
2.3 Networks at the regional level 
In principle, networks of technology-based firms exist at various spatial scales. Some of them 
by their very nature tend to be international or global, since their intention is to go beyond the 
limits of a region or a country. Alliances and cooperations to open up foreign markets or to 
tap into highly specialised foreign knowledge resources are of this type (Hagedoorn and 
Schankenraad 1990, Dibner and Bulluck 1992). Others are biased to the national level, e.g. 
when improved competitiveness of certain national industries through cooperation is inten-
ded. This can be achieved through such networks as national R&D consortia and may include 
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federal institutions 2). Also formal industry links of major research universities as well as of 
federal research laboratories tend to be at a national level. 
Under certain conditions, such as the following, networks benefit considerably from geogra-
phical proximity and agglomeration, however (see Scott 1987, Sabel 1989, Porter 1990, 
Storper and Harrison 1991, Saxenian 1991, Bergman et al. 1991, Vet and Scott 1992): 
* The requirement of good communication, of a common understanding and of regular 
face-to-face contacts as is the case in joint research and development or in joint pro-
duction which includes technology development; the regular and close interaction then 
goes beyond a "static" division of labour and allows benefits arising from mutual lear-
ning (Saxenian 1991, Storper 1992); 
* the requirement of close monitoring and control of the partner (e.g. the case of the 
venture capitalist investing in high-tech start-ups: Malecki 1990); 
* involvement trust which is developed through long lasting relations and is favoured by 
a common cultural background (Sabel 1992); 
* involvement of local universities or research institutions which are showing a "regional 
mission" (e.g. aiming at an upgrading of the regional economy) 3); 
* involvement of local, state or semi-public institutions with similar goals such as deve-
lopment agencies or institutions for technology transfer 4) . 
In regional networks in principle all kinds of firms may become engaged. Storper and 
Harrison (1991) give examples of networks consisting of large as well as small firms both in 
2) Examples in the US electronics industry are R&D consortia such as SEMATECH and MCC (Microelectronic 
and Computer Technology Corporation: Alie 1990). 
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3) There are a number of studies which demonstrate the role and mechanisms through which universities become 
interlinked with their respecitve regional economies (for an overview see Luger and Goldstein 1990). These 
mechanisms include direct links to firms such as joint R&D projects, contract research, consulting as well as the 
establishment of science and research parks, incubators and technology centers. Then, there are more informal 
links established mainly through former students and graduates who start to work in regional firms or start their 
own firms. 
4) In Europe also regional organisations of industry and labor (industry associations, unions) have become involved 
in technology related programs in certain regions (e.g. Baden Wiirttemberg, Third Italy). In the US this seems 
to be less the case. 
traditional and in high-technology industries. In some cases large firms organise a system of 
regional component suppliers (Baden Wiirttemberg, Silicon Valley, Southern California) 5). 
In other cases, small firms create regional networks of their own, collaborating in 
development, design, production and distribution (cases of Third Italy, the Swiss Jura, the 
Danish Jutland, as well as again Baden Wiirttemberg and Silicon Valley: see Storper and 
Harrisson, 1991). 
Regional networks seem to have a particularly high relevance, however, for the formation of 
new high-technology firms (Miller and Cote 1987). Relevant linkages include those to finance 
institutions (venture capitalists), business services (consulting, legal and accounting firms) as 
well as to suppliers and customers. More and more they include also linkages to universities 
and research institutions. Many universities are actively supporting and strengthening their 
ties to the respective regional economies through the promotion of start-ups, of consulting 
activities and contract research (Sternberg 1988, Luger and Goldstein 1990). New technology 
based firms are often generated through spin-offs from existing high-tech firms or research 
institutions. They tend to stay in the region where the founder was formally employed or edu-
cated and they frequently keep relations to their incubating firm or institution. 
Many of the studies of such dynamic regions with intensive networking are rather "euphoric" 
and therefore uncritical (for a critical review see Amin and Robbins 1990, Todtling 1992). 
Often they are also too general and ahistoric, neglecting the specific competitive situation of 
an industry as well as the historic aspects of the formation and the subsequent transformation 
of such networks. Therefore it is of interest to investigate for specific technology-based indu-
stries in a region 
* which institutions and firms were important actors in a network and have been contri-
buting to the formation and growth of the respective industry; 
* how have such networks been changing with the maturing of the industry; and 
* how do networks of old and new industries compare: are they highly industry-specific 
and different or is there also a common or generic part which is passing on accumula-
ted knowledge and skills of the past to the new industry? 
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5) See Sabel (1989) and Schmitz (1992) for Baden Wiirttemberg, Saxenian (1991, 1992) for the Silicon Valley and 
Scott (1992), Vet and Scott (1992) for Southern California . 
3) The Case of the Greater Boston Region 
The state of Massachusetts and its core area the Greater Boston region 6) for several reasons 
provide an interesting case to investigate these questions. The region has a long history of 
industrial development and has seen a series of structural transformations from the early 
textile industry in the past century to the modern high-tech industries such as the computer 
and electronic industry along "Route 128" or the new biotechnology industry in Cambridge 
and Boston (Harrison and Kluver 1989). At the end of the 1980s there were about 3000 high-
tech companies in Massachusetts, accounting for about 10% of the state's employment 
(Rosegrant and Lampe 1992). The region, furthermore, provides a rich institutional environ-
ment for high-tech firms as regards universities and educational institutions, research labora-
tories as well as venture capital and producer services. 
In the following, I want to explore to what extent, in addition to excellent factor conditions, 
these institutions and firms have contributed to the formation and development of two 
technology-based industries: the computer industry on the one hand and the biotechnlogy 
industry on the other. These two industries were selected since they are of different maturity 
and allow us to observe the transformation of networks. 
The findings rely partly on available studies and materials (such as historical and recent stu-
dies of "Route 128"), and partly on personal interviews with key persons in relevant insti-
tutions and firms 7). In the following, at first those institutions which have triggered techno-
logy-based development in the region will briefly be characterised (3 .1), then the role of net-
works relevant for the development of the computer industry (representing a mature industry) 
on the one hand (3.2) and of the biotechnology industry (representing a newly emerging one) 
on the other (3.3) will be analysed. 
6) The Greater Boston region is definded here by the counties of Essex, Middlesex, Norfok and Suffolk. 
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7) Interviews with several key persons in institutions of the respective networks were conducted. They include 
amongst others the technology licensing offices or related activities at MIT, Harvard and Worcester Poly-
technic, the Biotechnology Center of Excellence in Boston, the Massachusetts Biotechnology Research Institute 
in Worcester, as well as selected venture capital firms and biotechnology firms in Cambridge and Worcester. 
3.1 Institutions for high-technology development 
Universities 
One of the outstanding features of the Massachusetts regional economy is its density of high 
quality universities. Altogether there are 68 universities and colleges in the state, in which 
about 100 000 people are employed and 250 000 students enrolled (Porter et al. 1991). The 
universities function as magnets attracting talented people and the best students from all over 
the US as well as from foreign countries, many of whom stay in the area after graduation 8). 
Two of these universities are particularly well known, but they contrast quite strongly in their 
relations to industry: Harvard, founded in 1636, being the oldest university in the area, has 
kept its distance to industry until recently. MIT, founded in 1861, in contrast, has from its start 
tried to build strong industry-links. Since the beginning of this century it has actively promoted 
these links through internships of students in industry, faculty consulting for industry, research 
for industry and government as well as through the encouragement of start-ups 9). 
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Although both Harvard and MIT have strong impacts on the regional economy mainly 
through the flow of graduates, consulting and other linkages, none has an explicit "regional 
mission", like many smaller or public universities in other states do. Instead they have a strong 
national and international orientatioil' MIT, in particular, has a large volume of industrially 
sponsered research, with the majority of its funding coming from companies located outside of 
Massachusetts (Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992, p. 19). It currently supports industry links 
through its licensing office and through its industrial liaison program. The licensing office has 
the goal of speeding up technology transfer from research to industry. Since 1987 between 50 
and 80 licensing agreements- per year have been set up: in total there are 350 active licenses 
currently. The estimate is that at most 1/2 of these go to firms in Massachusetts. The indu-
8) Only about 15 % of the undergraduates at Harvard and MIT come from within Massachusetts and about 30 % of 
MIT's graduate students (15% of Harvard's) are from foreign countries. On the other hand, almost 1/3 of 
MIT's 70000 alumni have settled in New England to work, mostly in Massachusetts (Rosegrant and Lampe 
1992, p. 16). 
9) Besides MIT, there are other universities in the area supporting industry-links (at a lower intensity) like North 
Eastern or Tufts University. 
strial liaison program grants for a fee a "window on MIT" to firms. Most of the subscribers 
(235 mostly large firms) are located outside Massachusetts and about 1/2 are from foreign 
countries 10). 
The start-up of companies founded by university alumni is a more local phenomenon. MIT 
supported these partly through a strong personal engagement of some professors but partly 
also through organisational provisions. Since the mid 1980s the technology licensing office has 
helped start-up companies by providing licensing support and by looking for reliable consul-
ting firms and venture capitalists ll). A study by the Bank of Boston (1989) counted more than 
600 total start-ups founded by MIT alumni in Massachusetts, employing about 300000 in 
total 12). A close observer of MIT start-ups in a recent study found that the success of those 
start-ups strongly depends on their technology-link to MIT (Roberts 1991) 13). 
Research laboratories ( def ense research) 
A strong stimulus for MIT as well as for the development of other research activities in the 
region was the attraction of a considerable amount of federal defense money since the second 
World War. This resulted in the spin-off of several research laboratories from MIT, such as 
the Lincoln and Draper Laboratories, as well as in the growth of defense contractors such as 
Raytheon and EG&G. In 1990 all private research laboratories had about 230 000 or 6% of 
the state's employment (Porter et al. 1991), the majority of their activities being defense 
related. 
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10) Interview with Lita Nelson from the MIT Technology Licensing Office as well as with Rob Brand and Diana 
Garcia from the MIT Industrial Liaison Office in Dec. 1992. 
11) Start-ups are in principle regarded by MIT as the better route for technology transfer, since the young firms are 
more committed to the new invention. However, only a minor fraction of the arising inventions is suitable for a 
venture-capitalized start-up. At MIT these are only about 3 % or at most a dozen a year (Nelson 1991). 
12) Companies whose founders had MIT connections include DEC, EG&G Inc., Teradyne Inc., Analogic Corpo-
ration, SoftTech Inc., Apollo Computer Inc., Software Art. Inc., Lotus Development Corporation, Symbolics 
Inc., Biogen Inc., Analog Devices and Bose Corporation. The 300000 also include employees of these firms 
outside the state. 
13) Roberts (1991) found that those start-ups which were able to draw from MIT research and to transer techno-
logy to their firm had a significantly better performance (growth and profitability) than those without. 
As in other high-tech regions, this defense research was certainly an important factor for the 
development of the high-tech sector of the region. It contributed to the formation of firms 
through direct spin-offs 14) as well as through the building up of a stock of highly trained labor 
of know how. However, there are also problems involved. First, technology transfer to regio-
nal firms remained limited due to the secrecy requirements of defense research and a lack of 
direct networking (Premus 1990). Second, the large amount of money involved created a con-
siderable dependency from the federal defense department. The negative side of this depen-
dency is felt right now as severe defense cuts and resulting budget and employment cuts in 
these labaratories are occurring. 
Business services and venture capitalists 
Massachusetts and in particular the Boston area have a large number of various kinds of 
business services partly specialised on high-tech firms (consulting, engineering, legal and 
accounting firms, financial services) as well as venture capitalists. Together in these service 
industries more than 250000 or 6,5 % are employed. These services are more than just a sup-
port structure for the regional industry since they export their services to a high degree to 
other regions and countries (e.g. Arthur D. Little or the Boston Consulting Group) but their 
density also helps to start and grow high-technology firms in the area. 
Boston, along with San Francisco and New York City, is a major center of the US venture 
capital industry (Florida et al. 1991, Green 1991). In 1988, Greater Boston had about sixty 
venture capital firms, controlling approximately $2 billion in capital or 12 % of the US venture 
capital assets (Preer 1992, p. 98). These firms are part of a large financial cluster in the region 
(Porter et al. 1991). The industry emerged in the 1950s and 1960s corresponding to the boom 
along "Route 128" and it was a major player in the growth of the computer industry in the 
following years 15). The firms specialise in certain types of new ventures or industries and 
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14) The Lincoln Laboratory generated about 60 spin-off companies since its existence (see "Spin-off companies 
from MIT Lincoln Laboratory", Fourth Edition, 1990); the Draper Laboratory accounted for 55 by the end of 
the 1980s (Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992, p. 99). 
15) The first venture capital firm (ARD) was founded already in 1946 in large part through the efforts of Karl T. 
Compton, Chairman of MIT, together with industrialists, financiers and members of MIT and Harvard. The 
many of them operate in the entire US. Spatial proximity, however, favours the identification 
and nurturing of new ventures since usually not just the provision of money but also close 
monitoring and management assistance are involved 16). Following the crisis of the computer 
industry, the venture capital industry in Massachusetts has been in decline since the mid 
1980s17>. 
Public Policies 
As stated above, the formation and growth of high tech industries in Massachusetts were 
strongly related to federal research money, in particular from the defense department. Activi-
ties and programs of the state and local governments were less important compared to other 
high-tech regions, such as the Research Triangle area in North Carolina or Austin and Dallas 
in Texas. In Massachusetts much of the high-tech growth in the 1950s and 1960s preceded 
state policies. The state became more active only since the mid 1970s (under Dukakis) and 
subsequently launched a "Centers of Excellence Program" in the 1980s. This was by and large 
an effort to decentralise some of the high-tech development from the Boston area to more 
outlying areas of the state (Ferguson and Ladd, 1988) 18). Both the rather small size of the 
program and the short duration (the state support was stopped with the change in government 
in 1989) preclude stronger effects, however. 
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company's most profitable investment was its stake in DEC. "Like the firms it invested in, ARD spun off new 
enterprises as staff and others connected with the company left to start new venture capital firms. Boston Capi-
tal, Palmer, Greylock, Charles River Partnership and Morgan-Holland all have ties to ARD" (Preer 1992, p. 
98) . 
16) Interview with Gloria Doubleday, Vice President, Commonwealth Bio Ventures Inc. in Worcester, March 1993. 
17) Massachusetts' share of funds invested in venture capital companies as well as of venture funds received by new 
companies has been falling since 1985 (Porter et al. 1991, p. 92). The problem currently is that "too much 
money is chasing too few projects". 
18) This program was launched in 1984 and supported university-based "Centers of Excellence" in Amherst 
(Polymer), Lowell (Photovoltaic and Polymer), Woods Hole (Oceanographic) and Cambridge 
(microelectronics at MIT). The program has supported the formation of the Biotech Research Park in 
Worcester through the provision of grants in critical stages of the project (interview with Fernando Quezada, 
Director, Biotech Center of Excellence Corporation, Jan. 1993). 
3.2 Networks in the computer industry 
The dynamics of the regional economy since the 1960s is strongly related to the formation, 
growth and, since the mid-1980s, decline of the computer industry. At the beginning of the 
1990s the computer industry in Massachusetts employed about 28 000 (less than 1 % of the 
overall employment), but it was part of a larger cluster which was made up also of software 
and data processing firms, electronic components, peripheral manufacturing, informaton 
technology services, telecommunications and precision instruments. In software and data-pro-
cessing about 41 000, and in the electronic components another 31 000, were working in 1990. 
In total, the information technology cluster employed about 100 000 or 2.6% in Massa-
chusetts. According to Porter et al. (1991) the computer industry, software and electronic 
components industry are strongly interlinked with each other, but linkages are developed also 
to other industries in the area. The medical industries, universities and research institutes, 
financial services, consulting and engineering firms serve both as clients and as consultants 
and cooperation partners. 
Many features of the computer industry's development resemble the classical product life 
cycle (Vernon 1966, Utterback 1979), and this partly relates also to its linkages and networks. 
After strong growth from the 1960s until the mid 1980s, the Massachusetts computer industry 
has slided into a severe crisis in the late 1980s. Its largest employers, Digital Equipment Cor-
poration, Wang, Prime and Data General, currently show considerable losses and have to 
undergo severe restructuring and lay-offs. To a considerable extent these difficulties have to 
do not just with the nature of their products (betting on the wrong "horse", in this case the 
minicomputer) but also with the organisation of the innovation and production process. In 
particular, the strong vertical integration of the largest firms and the abandoning of regional 
networks seems to contribute to their problems. 
Formation and early growth period 
The computer industry in the Boston area was started by researchers from MIT (Digital 
Equipment Corporation: DEC) and from Harvard (Wang) in the 1950s. The firm formation 
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process accelerated in the 1960s (25 start-ups of computer firms) and in the 1970s (23 start-
ups: Saxenian 1992). The growth of these and other high-tech firms (such as electronic pro-
ducts and instruments) occured mainly along "Route 128", a circumferential highway around 
Boston and Cambridge 19) and was in the beginning strongly supported by military and aero-
space contracts 20). In the 1960s and early 1970s a growing demand for minicomputers and 
electronic products stimulated the firm formation process. Hundreds of small electronic, 
component and software firms sprang up, many as suppliers or subcontractors to the mini-
computer firms. Regional interfirm-networks thus became more and more articulated during 
this formation and early growth period (Shimshoni 1966, Dorfman 1983, Preer 1992, 
Rosegrant and Lampe 1992) 21>. Figure 2 summarizes the main actors and the respective lin-
kages involved in the development of the computer industry along Route 128. 
The entrepreneurs came partly from the universities like MIT and other research institutions 
but partly also from existing firms as second or third generation spin-offs from the pioneers 
(Shimshoni 1966, Preer 1992) 22>. In many cases not just the entrepreneurs but also knowledge 
about technologies, management techniques and customers were transfered from those incu-
bating firms and institutions to the new firms (Shimshoni 1966 23), Roberts 1991). Venture 
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19) "Route 128" was originally built to promote recreational access to the north and south. The first section was 
opened in 1951 and was then called by critics 'the road to nowhere'. This changed quickly into 'the magic semi-
circle' after about 100 firms had moved there already by 1955 (Rosegrant and Lampe 1992). A number of pri-
vately developed industrial parks sprang up and provided the required physical facilities and office space. The 
area includes the counties Middlesex, Suffolk, Norfolk and Essex. 
20) In 1962 federal government purchases accounted for fully half of the sales of Route-128-firms (Saxenian, 1992, 
p . 45). 
21) Interview in may 1993 with John Cullinane, founder of the Cullinet Software Inc., one of the first companies in 
the region to specialize in computer software products. Preer (1992, p. 97), in addition, finds that "a web of local 
relations needed by the high-technology industry was developed in the Route 128 technopolis. During the 
formation of the technopolis, information flowed freely among firms, universities and research institutes. Most 
of the relations were informal. The intricate connections among MIT researchers and key personnel at DEC 
and other companies facilitated the high rate of innovation that characterised the emerging computer industry 
in Massachusetts. " 
22) Besides MIT and the Research Laboratories the defense contractor Raytheon, being the source of close to 150 
start-ups, was one of the most important incubating organisations. Then the computer firms themselves produ-
ced spin-offs: Data General, founded in 1968, was a spin-off from DEC; Prime, founded in 1972, was a spin-off 
from the Boston operation of Honeywell (Preer 1992). 
23) Shimshoni (1966) was one of the first to investigate the "embedding" of Route-128-firms into the region more 
systematically. In a survey covering 151 firms in the instruments industry (including electronic and computer 
capitalists, which were still scarce in the beginning (1950s) 24), strongly supported the firm 
formation process since the 1960s through the provision of capital as well as management 
monitoring and assistance. 
Maturity and decline 
During the 1970s the leading minicomputer firms (DEC, Wang, Data General, Prime) grew 
rapidly, partly through vertical integration in order to realize economies of scale and scope. 
This was a reasonable strategy at that time, in a period of technology leadership as well as of 
stable external conditions and growth. The leading firms internalised the production of elec-
tronic and mechanical components (e.g. integrated circuits, memory chips, printed circuit 
boards and disc-drives) as well as much of the operating system and software since they were 
betting on proprietary instead of open architectures. In doing this, they reduced ties to local 
subcontractors and other firms and weakened or abandoned the regional network. This con-
sequently reduced both knowledge flows between the firms and joint learning 25). 
However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s conditions in the international computer- and 
electronic industry had fundamentally changed (Gomes-Casseres 1992). 
firms) he found that 
* most of the new firms were founded near their "parent organisations" (l/3 by former MIT students) from 
which the technology for the new products was frequently transfered; 
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* they were to a high degree supported by other firms and institutions from the region providing risk capital, 
services, technical supplies and information about markets; 
* more than half of the firms (56%) cited at least one of the local sources (universities, consultants as well as 
professional and social contacts) as most frequently used; 
* 58 % of the respondents mentioned New England as an important center of technology in their fields; and 
* 44 % indicated New England as their main market center. 
24) In the 1950s the Bank of Boston had quickly responded to the capital needs of high-tech companies and had 
provided finance. They did this with large success since in the early 1960s they had accounts from 85% of the 
high-tech firms along Route 128 (Rosegrant and Lampe 1992, p . 120). 
25) DEC, Data General, Wang and Prime followed the route of vertical integration. According to Saxenian (p. 218 
f) "by 1976 Data General made many internal components, from printed circuit boards to core and semicon-
ductor memories. By 1981 ... it was designing and manufacturing more than 80% of the final product they sold". 
Likewise DEC "by 1983 was internally designing and manufacturing everything from keyboards and display 
monitors to disk drives, custom integrated circuits, computer memories, printed circuit boards, and power sup-
plies". In contrast to Silicon Valley firms, Route 128 firms also limited labor mobility as much as possible by re-
warding long-term staying and careers inside the firms. 
* New players had emerged on the global scene (in particular Japanese and other Far 
Eastern firms), competition strongly intensified, prices fell and the pace of product 
change sped up. 
* Equipment and components became more standardised and almost became "commo-
dities". Consequently the value chain was broken up and newly reorganised (Gomes-
Casseres 1992). This also implied a reorganisation in space since new production faci-
lities, particularly for semiconductors, components and peripherals, were frequently 
located in low wage countries and regions (Gordon 1991). 
* The standardisation of components reinforced a trend towards open systems architec-
ture, putting a pressure on the old leading firms (such as IBM or DEC) which had 
been betting on proprietory systems. 
* Finally, there was a trend towards "downsizing", favouring microcomputers and PC-
networks. Both mainframes and minicomputers (the principal segment of the Route 
128 firms) lost market shares, but the minicomputers were more affected since they got 
squeezed in between the downsizing mainframes and the growing segment of PC's and 
workstations. 
One of the consequences of these changes was a substantial reduction of the benefits of verti-
cal integration and an increasing importance of "network strategies" both at the global and 
regional level. At the global level, firms entered into various strategic alliances with other 
firms of the "triad" (US, Japan and Europe) in order to secure supplies, to trade/develop 
technologies or gain market access 26). Firm networks were intensified at lower spatial scales 
as well. 
In the US, computer and electronic firms in the two leading regions, Silicon Valley and Route 
128, were strongly challenged by the new situation, and for various reasons they reacted quite 
differently during the 1980s. 27). 
Silicon Valley firms (e.g. Hewlett Packard, Apple Computers, Sun Microsystems, Silicon 
26) See Gomes-Casseres (1992) for a more detailed analysis of these international alliances in the computer indu-
stry. 
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27) Saxenian (1992) has provided a very detailed study of this topic, based on 160 in-depth interviews with firm 
managers and industry representatives in the two regions. 
Graphics) started to build more flexible organisational structures (flatter hierarchies, more 
autonomous subunits) and focused on their respective core capabilities (Saxenian 1991, 1992). 
Consequently they externalised other activities and functions and thereby rebuilt a dense 
regional supplier network. Subcontracting relations were changed from the traditional type 
(buying of components of low complexity at low prices) towards more selective relations of 
higher quality . The number of subcontractors was reduced but their respective activities 
became more complex since they included quality control and development 28). The new rela-
tions were based on continuous information exchange and frequently involved joint learning. 
Due to this networking strategy Silicon Valley firms were faster in developing and prototyping 
new products 29) and in the end were clearly more successful than their East coast counter-
parts. 
Route 128 firms, on the other hand, did not substantially change their past strategies although 
their specific product, the minicomputer, got more and more under pressure both from the 
mainframes and from the PC's and new work stations. They stuck to the minicomputers and 
the proprietory architecture and stayed rather strongly vertically integrated and hierarchically 
organised. They did not rebuild regional networks as the Silicon Valley firms did 30). At the 
end of the decade, and still today, some of them are in a severe crisis, showing considerable 
losses and laying off employment on a large scale 31 ). 
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28) "Suppliers were increasingly drawn into the design and development of new systems and components at a very 
early stage, and became closely integrated into the customers's organisation in the process" (Saxenian, 1992, p. 
311). 
29) A comparative study concluded that Silicon Valley semiconductor firms founded between 1978 and 1985 could 
prototype products 60% faster and ship them 40% faster than other firms in the U.S. (Schoonhoven and Eisen-
hart 1991). 
30) Saxenian (1992, p. 5) contrasts the two regions by stating that "Silicon Valley's regional network-based indu-
strial system encourages joint learning and continuous innovation among specialised producers, while Route 
128's independent firm-based system is constrained by the organisational rigidities of its leading producers and 
their isolation from external sources on know-how and information". 
A recent survey by Bathelt (1991), covering 160 firms in 5 high-tech regions of the US and Canada, including the 
Boston area, confirms these findings. The study revealed that, contrary to the small firms, particularly the large 
Route 128 firms had very low backward and forward linkages to the region. In total (weighted average of all 40 
Boston firms in the survey) only 22 % of all inputs were drawn from a 50 miles radius, whereas only 4 % of total 
output was sold in the region. 
31) Since the late 1980s considerable job losses occured in the once leading firms - DEC, Prime, Honeywell, Wang 
It is only recently that the leading computer firms in Massachusetts have begun to try new 
strategies and to change their product structure and organisation more radically (Porter et al. 
1991). DEC e.g. is moving towards network solutions, system integration and software deve-
lopment, and Prime has gone into the CAD/CAM market and formed an alliance with the 
Californian MIPS computer systems to get access to leading edge technolgies in hardware. 
Data General has split into two units, one responsible for the development of open systems, 
the other upgrading the proprietary system. The company has recently also introduced a new 
line of work stations, for which the firm applied a new distribution approach by entering into 
partnerships with a number of resellers familiar with the needs of specific markets. These 
develop software which they sell together with Data General work stations. 
The question arises why Silicon Valley and Route 128 firms reacted collectively so differently 
in the 1980s. Possible explanations are: 
* Route 128 firms are an older vintage of firms and thus are oriented to older types of 
products; due to technological and organisational rigidities they are somewhat con-
strained to stay in their specific market segment. 
* Route 128 firms are "burdened" by the industrial history of the area. They rely more on 
a conservative business culture and on inherited management techniques, making 
them stick more to the hierarchical large firm model. 
* The regional network of suppliers at the beginning of the 1980s in Silicon Valley was 
still in better shape and easier to revitalise compared to the one of Route 128. 
However, the situation for the region as a whole is not as bleak as it looks from the per-
spective of the older minicomputer firms. Overall, the institutions and· the networks for the 
formation of high-tech firms are still functioning although at a slower pace than in the past. 
There are still very dynamic segments emerging in the information technology cluster such as 
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and Data General. Between 1985 and 1991 an estimated 14000 employees in the minicomputer industry in Mas-
sachusetts (about 1/3) had lost their jobs (Preer, 1992, p.7), but the employment reduction has continued since 
then. This has been reflected in a decline of total high-tech employment in Massachusetts: Harrison and Kluver 
(1989) have shown the dramatic change in the region's high- tech sector from an increase of 120000 jobs bet-
ween 1973 to 1984 to a loss of 20000 from 1984 to 1987. 
some newer computer firms (Stratus, Thinking Machines) 32) as well as software firms which 
expanded considerably in the 1980s 33). Moreover, there are various other dynamic industries 
belonging to the "knowledge cluster" (universities, research, consulting), the "financial cluster" 
as well as the "health cluster" (Porter et al. 1991). A part of the latter is the newly emerging 
biotechnology industry. 
3.3 Networks in the biotechnology industry 
Industry background 
Biotechnology, the commercialization of modern biology, is a very young industry 34). 
Although major scientific progress such as the discovery of the structure of the DNA had 
occurred during the 1950s, it was not until the mid 1970s that the technology had advanced far 
enough to be commercialised. In 1992 there were about 1100 biotechnology companies in the 
US 35). Initially "gene splicing" drew public attention; the true breakthrough, however, was the 
ability to make larger complex molecules ("proteins"), the basic chemical building block of 
life. The following features shape the structure and dynamics of the industry (see Burrill et al. 
1989, Feinstein 1990, Nelson 1991 and Dibner 1991): 
* The industry is still closely related to (university) research and companies are founded 
in response to scientific discoveries 36). 
32) Stratus, founded in 1980 in part by a former Data General employee, concentrates in fault-tolerant computer 
systems. Thinking Machines established in 1983 by a Harvard and a MIT PhD graduate, is the second-largest 
manufacturer of supercomputers in the US and had 10% of the world's base in 1990 (Porter 1991). 
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33) About 70% of the 800 software firms in Massachusetts were founded after 1980, and employment grew by 
10.8% annually from 1980-1990 (Porter et al . 1991). The latest Guide to the Massachusetts Software Industry, 
published by the Massachusetts Computer Software Council (1992), counts as many as 1415 firms in the state. 
34) Biotechnology companies are generally defined as those that " ... use biological processes to develop products 
for human health care, agriculture productivity, animal health, food safety and nutrition and industrial and 
environmental improvement" (Burrill and Lee, 1992). An early pioneer was Genentech, founded in 1976 in San 
Francisco. 
35) Most of them are small companies; only about 150 large corporations have established major R&D efforts in 
biotechnology (Dibner 1991). Stock in about 225 companies is publicly traded (Burrill and Lee, 1992) . 
36) As Lita Nelson (1991, p.41) states it: "For the biotechnology industry, and particularly that segment concerned 
with therapeutics, the university is the primary source of new product ideas. The typical new product concept 
* The product development cycle is very long (3-8 years); consequently, only the older 
companies are now having products on the market. The long time lag is caused not just 
by the scientific explorations but also by a lengthy regulatory review process. 
* The long and expensive product development cycle requires long term financing. 
Usually there are multiple rounds of financing and frequently support from larger 
companies involved. 
* The industry, like pharmaceuticals, is strongly regulated: The Food and Drug Admini-
stration, the Department of Agriculure and the Environmental Protection Agency are 
critical regulatory bodies. In addition, cities and communities have created different 
regulatory environments, 
Current dynamics of the industry arise from start-ups of small firms developing their products 
in close relation to universities or research facilities. However, capital and other requirements 
very often force small firms into alliances with large companies in pharmaceutical, medical or 
agricultural industries. Dibner and Bulluck (1992) observed about 1300 strategic alliances of 
US biotechnology firms, of which 55 % were within the US and 45 % with foreign partners, 
mainly European or Japanese companies. The general pattern is that the small firms provide 
the technology and the large firms contribute finance and market access as well as regulatory 
and production knowledge. The most frequent types of alliances were marketing (35 % ) and 
licencing agreements (25 % ) as well as research contracts ( 11 % ) . In the late 1980s also allian-
ces among the small firms became more common. 
In addition, university linkages play an important role since 70 % of US biotechnology compa-
nies maintain such relations (Dibner and Bulluck, 1992). These university links comprise a 
broad spectrum, from single patent licensing agreements and sponsored research to more 
complex research and development collaborations. The typical motives for companies to enter 
these links are early access to technology, staying up to date with scientific advances, access to 
special equipment or materials, access to intellectual property rights, or cost savings through 
the externalisation of development work (Nelson 1991). 
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arises directly from a scientific finding: the scientist observes a new effect, isolates a new gene and/or protein, 
and then hypothesizes its function and its use in the human body ." In this process, the road from 'pure science' 
to the vision of a product is unusually short, however, from there to a product on the market it is unusually long. 
Biotechnology in Massachusetts 
The state of Massachusetts ranks third after California and New York/New Jersey as loca-
tions for the biotechnology industry, about 10% of the companies in the US are located there. 
The industry started in the Cambridge/Boston area in the late 1970s with the foundation of 
BioGen (1978) and Genetics (1980). In 1992 there were already 130 companies with annual 
sales of$ 1,62 billion and an employment of about 13 000 (NAIOP, 1992). Still, most of them 
are quite small. Reflecting the region's strength in medical institutions, the companies are pri-
marily engaged in therapeutics ( 41 % ) and diagnostics (39 % ) , whereas just a few (8 % ) are in 
agriculture (Feinstein 1990). 
Since most of the companies in Massachusetts are still early in the product development cycle, 
they are on average highly R&D intensive: 44% of the employment is in R&D, 31 % in admi-
nistration and only 24 % in production. However, future employment growth is expected to be 
much stronger in manufacturing. Another consequence of the early development stage is low 
profitability: 2/3 of the companies have reported losses in 1990 (Feinstein 1990). 
Local institutions have played a considerable role for the development of this industry in the 
region (see fig. 3)37. The major factor is the preeminence of its research institutions. Both 
Harvard and MIT have made major committments to molecular biology since the 1950s and 
have a number of Nobel laureates working in biological sciences. Both universities also have 
active licensing offices speeding up the commercialisation of scientific discoveries through 
licensing-help and through the support of start-ups 38). Besides these two, other universities 
like Tufts and Worcester are active in this field. 
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37) Fig. 3 is strongly based on interviews amongst others with Lita Nelson (MIT Technology Licensing Office), 
Skip Irving (United Office of Technology Transfer, Worcester), Ronald Baird (Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 
Fernando Quezada (President of the Biotechnology Center of Excellence Corporation, Boston), Mark 
Goldberg and Josef Carter (Massachusetts Biotechnology Research Institute), Gloria Doubleday 
(Commonwealth Bio Ventures Inc.), as well as on information from several Biotechnology firms. 
38) About 1/2 of all 40 start-ups which the MIT licensing office supported since the mid 1980s were in biotechno-
logy . A typical MIT start-up involves a PhD graduate, a faculty member and a venture capitalist. Sometimes 
also the university takes a small share of equity. In order to optimise communication to MIT researchers the 
new firms often try to locate close to MIT (interview with Lita Nelson, Dec. 1992). 
In addition, the extensive medical community makes significant contributions. The Massa-
chusetts General Hospital is a leading medical research center in biotechnology. Currently it 
maintains research agreements with several major health care firms. 39) The Dana-Farber 
Cancer Institute provided the early research for ImmunoGen, a biotechnology company 
developing cancer fighting monoclonal antibodies (Feinstein 1990) 40>. 
The strong role of university and medical research is reflected in the location pattern of bio-
technology firms. 30% are located in Cambridge (close to MIT and Harvard) and about 10% 
in Boston, primarily near the teaching hospitals (Feinstein 1990). A new biotechnology focus 
is emerging in the Worcester Research Park (70 km west of Boston), which currently has 
about 14 % of the firms. In Feinstein' s ( 1990) study 84 % of the companies reported that pro-
ximity to a university was an important location criteria and 35 % stated it as their first priority 
in site selection. 
Due to the large and long-run capital requirements, venture capitalists together with other 
finance sources are important actors for the development of the industry. Although only a 
share of the start-ups and new projects are financed locally 41 ), the large number of venture 
capitalists in the area is certainly a favouring factor. Finally, specialised business services such 
as lawyers, accountants, banks and architects, familiar with the needs of the biotechnology 
industry, are supporting the growing industry. 
State and local governments have played a smaller role in development of this industry in 
Massachusetts than in other states such as North Carolina or Maryland. Most firms starting in 
the past decade did so without much government support. Local and state institutions, howe-
39) Including Hoechst for $68 million, Shisheide for $85 million and Bristol-Myers/Squibb for $37 million. 
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40) Active in biomedical research are also the Childrens's Hospital, Beth Israel Hospital, Brigham and Womens's 
Hospital and others which are affiliated with Harvard Medical School (NAIOP, 1992. p. A6). Rosegrant and 
Lampe find that "many of the more than forty-five biotechnology firms in the Cambridge and Boston area 
either had their roots in the local medical establishment or maintain direct links with the medical reserach 
community" (1992, p. 19). 
41) An estimation by Lita Nelson from the MIT licensing office is a local venture capital share of about 1/2 for the 
MIT start-ups. The rest is financed by venture capitalists from New York as well as the West Coast, the other 
major centers of venture capital in the US. 
ver, played a stronger role in the formation of the biotechnology research park in 
Worcester42). 
An important factor for the development of the industries is the "regulatory environment" of 
an area as well as the public opinion towards it. Both factors seem to be favourable in Massa-
chusetts. A high percentage of firms expressed satisfaction with the local regulations in the 
study by Feinstein (1990), whereby not necessarily an absence of rules, but their longrun sta-
bility is sought by the firms. The public opinion towards the industry can also be a relevant 
location factor as the recent move of a large BASF R&D unit from Germany to Worcester/-
Massachusetts has demonstrated. BASF stated that by moving to Massachusetts it was 
avoiding resistance against the industry in its home country. 
However, like the industry in general, the biotechnology firms of Massachusetts are nut just 
embedded into local and regional networks, they quite rapidly get interlinked into national 
and international ones. Financial and production requirements as well as the need to gain 
access to (foreign) regulatory knowledge and markets force firms into alliances and partly 
mergers with large U.S. and international firms. Firms like Genetics Institute, Cambridge Bio-
tech or Biogen have each entered into several of these alliances, covering R&D joint ventu-
res, R&D contracts, licensing agreements, as well as manufacturing and marketing agree-
ments (see. fig. 4 for selected Massachusetts firms). These alliances are not without ambiva-
lence, however, since local industry is partly selling away its downstream activities and expan-
sion opportunities. It is expected that much of the manufacturing, marketing and administra-
tion of the biotechnology industry will locate outside the region (Brunetta, 1992). 
4) Conclusions 
The following conclusions may be derived from the analysis. (1) Local and regional institu-
42) Interviews with Fernando Quezada (Biotechnology Center of Excellence Corporation), Josef Carter, Abraham 
Haddad and Mark Goldberg (Massachusetts Biotechnology Research Institute) and Tom Anrews (Worcester 
Biotechnology Research Park) in March 1993. See also Gorer (1991). 
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tions matter for the development of high-technology firms. Relevant institutions and actors in 
general include research universities, technology transfer institutions, venture capital firms 
and specialised business services as well as suppliers and customers. Critical is the interaction 
and the networking of such organisations, not just their mere existence. 
(2) Networks differ between industries as the comparison of the computer and biotechnology 
industry shows. The computer industry relies less on university research and has consequently 
few research collaborations with universities. Instead, computer firms rely more on interfirm 
linkages. They partly form complex networks with suppliers of electronic and mechanical 
components as well as of software, linkages which often include collaborative development. 
Biotechnology, being at an early stage, is still very R&D-intensive and consequently relies 
much more on university or hospital research (frequently local links) as well as on venture 
capital firms and other financially strong partners. Due to these features and particularly the 
lack of vertical linkages within the region the biotechnology industry currently does not 
achieve a similar spectacular growth as the computer and electronic industry did in the 1960s. 
(3) Networks change during the life-cycle of an industry. In general, local and regional net-
works are more important for the formation and early growth period. As the industry matures 
not just the markets but also the supplier and collaborative linkages become international and 
global. However, this is not a deterministic pattern since there are different models of indu-
strial organisation. Regional networks may still be relevant also in mature industries, as the 
computer firms in Silicon Valley have demonstrated in the 1980s. In contrast to Route 128 
firms, they achieved competitive advantages by relying on regional suppliers and collaborators 
and thereby reduced cost and improved their innovative performance as well as product qua-
lity. On the other hand, the biotechnology industry shows that not just local university and 
medical links, but also international alliances, may be necessary already at an early stage. This 
fact results from the specificities of the industry such as the long product development cycle 
and the high and long-term capital demand. The strong link to university and medical 
research may get weaker in the future, once production becomes more important. 
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(4) High-tech industries draw on very specific knowledge-bases, such as research in particular 
technological fields or highly specialised suppliers of components or services. There are 
usually only few regions in a country where such "localisation economies" for certain 
industries exist and these can prosper. Consequently, specific high-tech industries are strongly 
concentrated in space. In larger knowledge-based economies such as the Greater Boston 
region, relevant institutions and networks in part are also of a "generic" nature, allowing the 
region to diversifiy and to develop new industries. Universities and educational institutions 
providing highly trained labor, as well as venture capitalists and business services contribute 
to an environment which supports the development of high-technology firms in general. The 
formation of the biotechnology industry in the Boston area in the 1980s was partly supported 
by the II inherited II network, namely the same institutions which had helped to start and 
develop Route 128. 
(5) Which policy conclusions can be derived? The rather special conditions and networks 
which allow high-tech industries to prosper reduce the possibility to grow those industries at 
many locations, although currently many regions around the world are trying to do this. 
"Environments" for high-tech industries cannot easily be "created" when important precondi-
tions are lacking. Only few regions have such features and, as the examples of Boston and 
other high-tech regions (Silicon Valley, Research Triangle Park in North Carolina) show, it 
takes quite a long time from the early beginnings to a dynamic selfsustaining development. 
In general, policies to stimulate technology-based development in a region should not aim at 
the currently "fashionable" high-tech industries. For these the respective region may not have 
the preconditions and, in addition, there is a strong interregional and international com-
petition for firms and markets. Instead, regions should focus on their existing industry and 
knowledge base and improve the innovative performance of these industries by strengthening 
networks between firms and relevant institutions. Networking, however, should not be con-
fined to the region but include firms and institutions in other regions and foreign countries. It 
is through this insertion into local/regional networks as well as into distant networks that 
technology-based firms are able to stay competititve in the long run. 
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Fig. 2: Regional network of the computer industry 

































Fig. 3: Regional network of the biotech industry 




























Fig. 4: Strategic Alliances of 
Massachusets Biotechnology Firms 
(after Brunetta 1992) 
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